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1 Introduction
The motivation for this paper comes from two behavioral regularities,
found in individual decision making studies, namely the Attraction Ef-
fect (AE) and the Compromise Effect (CE) (see Huber et al., 1982; Huber
and Puto, 1983; Simonson, 1989). Suppose a person must choose between
say two apartments, A and B, that differ in two salient attributes, such
as size and location. Two such apartments are shown in Figure 1 (where
higher values of both size and location are assumed to be more desirable).
The choice is non-trivial since A is smaller but better located than B.
(a) Attraction Effect. (b) Compromise Effect.
Figure 1: Attraction and Compromise Effects in individual choice.
Suppose a third apartment, C, which is dominated by say apartment B but
not by A, is added to the choice set (see Figure 1a).1 The Attraction Effect
(AE) arises when the decision maker is more likely to choose B when the
set of alternatives is {A, B, C} than {A, B}. This violates the axiom known
as Regularity (see Luce, 1977), which states that the probability of choosing
an option cannot increase when the choice set is expanded.
Consider then the case where adding the third alternative C makes op-
tion B a compromise (second best on each attribute dimension), as shown
in Figure 1b. The Compromise Effect (CE) occurs when the decision maker
is more likely to choose B when the set of options is {A, B, C} than when
it is {A, B}, once more a violation of regularity.
The AE and CE have been found to significantly influence choice in
1C is dominated by B in the sense that B is strictly better than C on both attribute
dimensions.
2
a variety of situations, such as product choice (Doyle et al., 1999), con-
tingent valuation (Bateman et al., 2008), job candidate selection (High-
house, 1996), sampling decisions (Noguchi and Stewart, 2014; Trueblood
et al., 2013), elections (Herne, 1997; Pan et al., 1995), choice among gam-
bles (Beauchamp et al., 2015; de Haan and van Veldhuizen, 2015; Herne,
1999; Wedell, 1991), and partner choice (Sedikides et al., 1999). Various
explanations for these effects have been put forward (see Section 2 below).
As far as we are aware, all the existing research on the AE and CE has
(with only two exceptions, described in the next section) been concerned
with individual choice situations.2 In this paper we ask: are there also AE
and CEs in interactive decision settings, where a group of decision makers
must arrive at a joint decision? We consider a fundamental class of joint
decision making situations, namely bargaining. Two or more individuals
can collaborate in a number of mutually beneficial ways, but there is a
conflict about exactly what form the collaboration should take. As an ex-
ample, consider a couple who are about to buy a new car and who are
considering a number of options. If they prefer different cars, they need to
negotiate. Another example is parents deciding which school to send their
child to, or a committee deciding among a number of policy proposals, or
job candidates. In all these cases the decision makers must agree on an
option from a finite set, and if they cannot agree, no choice is made, and
they receive low payoffs.
We believe an investigation of the AE and CE in bargaining could be
interesting and useful. Negotiation researchers as well as practitioners
might be interested in learning the conditions under which adding a dom-
inated option to an existing menu of options is likely to affect the bargain-
ing outcome, and when one can expect to be able to increase the likelihood
of an agreement on a certain ‘target’ option by manipulating the menu of
feasible agreements such that the target becomes a compromise.
In order to study the AE and CE in bargaining we take a very simple
approach, where the attributes are not size, quality and so on, but sim-
ply quantities of money. More precisely, players negotiate over a set of
options (“contracts”), where each option has only two attributes, namely
2 Another paper by the authors, Galeotti et al. (2016), based on a previous experiment
designed to investigate the trade-off between equality and efficiency in bargaining, em-
pirically documents a CE, but the AE was not investigated. The current paper launches a
systematic investigation of the CE and AE in bargaining.
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how much money each player gets if they agree to the option in question.3
See Figure 2 below. The set of feasible contracts (the contract set) either con-
sists of two, S = {A, B}, or three contracts, T = {A, B, C}. An agreement
is an element from the contract set (the players cannot agree to more than
one element, or to a lottery over contracts). If they agree to say contract B,
then player 1 (2) gets a monetary payoff, B1 (B2). If they fail to agree, each
bargainer gets zero.
(a) Attraction Effect. (b) Compromise Effect.
Figure 2: The Attraction and Compromise Effects in bargaining.
In Figure 2a the contract C is strictly dominated by B, but not by A. We
define the AE as follows: the bargainers are more likely to agree on B when
the contract set is T = {A, B, C} than when it is S = {A, B}. In terms of
the data, the CE means that the proportion of agreements on B is higher
in the first than the second case. In Figure 2b, adding contract C makes
B a compromise (i.e., each player’s second best option in terms of money
payouts). The CE arises when the bargainers are more likely to agree on
B when the contract set is {A, B, C} than when it is {A, B}. As we explain
below, we see both the AE and the CE as a violation, at the level of the
aggregate data, of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives condition,
IIA (Nash, 1950), which states that if the bargainers agree to some option
when there is a large set of alternative options available, then the same
option is agreed to when the set of alternatives is reduced.4
3This specification is of course unrealistic for some settings (the negotiations may in-
volve real items with no clearly defined monetary values). The advantage is that it allows
us to transparently manipulate the attributes of the available options, and see how this in
turn affects the AE and CE. Future work can broaden our investigation to other domains.
4IIA is the analogue to the Regularity axiom for interactive settings, and says that the
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Why might we expect there to (not) be an AE and CE in bargaining in
the first place? Consider first bargaining theory. As we show in Section 5
below, two leading cardinal cooperative bargaining models, the Nash Bar-
gaining Solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution (Nash,
1950; Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975) both rule out the AE. Moreover, they
yield different predictions regarding the CE.5 Furthermore, two ordinal
bargaining solutions, the Fallback Solution (Brams and Kilgour, 2001) and
the Ordinal Egalitarian Solution (Conley and Wilkie, 2012), predict the CE
but disagree on the AE. So theory provides an unclear picture.
Second, empirical research on bargaining (and other settings, see Camerer,
2003) has found that certain outcomes (payoff divisions) are often more fo-
cal (Schelling, 1960) than others. Typical payoff-based sources of focality
are equality, efficiency, and total earnings maximization, see for example
Isoni et al. (2014) and Roth and Murnighan (1982). We conjectured that
properties such as being a compromise, or domination, could also confer
focality on a contract, and might thus give rise to the CE and AE.
Based on these models and findings from existing research, we develop
a number of hypotheses that are tested by collecting and comparing data
from bargaining games with different contract sets.
Our main finding is that there are significant AE and CEs under certain
conditions that relate to the money payoffs offered by the contracts.
Significant CE: First, we observe no significant CE when one of the two
base contracts (A or B) offers the players exactly the same payoffs. Such a
contract is so focal and universally agreed on that there is little or no ‘room’
for raising its popularity further by making it a compromise. It is also
not possible to increase the frequency of the unequal contract by making
it a compromise. Second, when neither A nor B offers equal payoffs, a
significant CE then arises when the target contract (the one that is made a
compromise by adding C) is the least unequal of the contracts in S. There
is also a significant CE when the two contracts are ‘equally unequal’ (i.e.,
located symmetrically around the 45 degree line).
Significant AE: As for the CE, there is no significant AE if one of the
base contracts offers the players exactly equal earnings. We observe a sig-
probability that the bargainers agree to a contract can never increase when the contract
set expands.
5As we explain below, these models cannot be directly applied to our setup, since our
set of feasible payoff is not convex. We instead apply the appropriate extensions of these
solutions, from Mariotti (1998) and Nagahisa and Tanaka (2002).
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nificant AE in only one case, when the target contract is the least unequal
contract and neither the C contract nor the target are exactly equal.
As already mentioned this is, to the best of our knowledge, the first
systematic investigation of the AE and CE in bargaining. We see our in-
vestigation as establishing an empirical bridgehead, and believe that there
are many opportunities for further exploration. These are described in
Section 8 below.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe
the related literature. We define the AE and CE in bargaining situations
in Section 3, and introduce the experimental bargaining games in Section
4. Section 5 describes our predictions and hypotheses. Section 6 describes
the experimental design and logistics. The experimental findings are de-
scribed in Section 7. Section 8 discusses the findings, and suggests some
future research. The Appendix contains the experimental instructions and
some details of the relevant bargaining theory.
2 Related Literature
Several explanations have been proposed for the AE and CE in individual
choice.6 Reason-based choice (see Shafir et al., 1993) assumes that the deci-
sion maker when faced with a difficult choice looks for reasons that allow
him or her to make a decision; such reasons can be based on dominance or
compromise. Loss aversion has also been invoked as an explanation (see
Simonson and Tversky, 1992).
Models of reference-dependent individual choice (see for example Bushong
et al., 2015; Ok et al., 2015; Bordalo et al., 2013; Cunningham, 2013; Ko˝szegi
and Szeidl, 2013; Tversky and Simonson, 1993; Wedell, 1991) allow the
attractiveness (utility) of a choice alternative to depend not only on its
own absolute properties, but also on how it is related to the other op-
tions. These models can sometimes generate an AE and CE in individual
6A recent overview of AE research can be found in Frederick et al. (2014). Most of
these studies use hypothetical choice methods. Some exceptions are Lichters et al. (2016),
Beauchamp et al. (2015), de Haan and van Veldhuizen (2015), Doyle et al. (1999), Herne
(1999), and Simonson and Tversky (1992). These studies find significant AEs with incen-
tivized choice (Lichters et al., 2016, find that the effect is stronger with incentivized than
with unincentivized choice). Some other criticisms of the existing studies are raised in
Lichters et al. (2015), Frederick et al. (2014), and Yang and Lynn (2014).
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choice. Moreover, psychological research has shown that the AE and CE
(and other effects) can arise from the processes and heuristics that individ-
uals employ when comparing choice options – see for example Ronayne
and Brown (2016), Noguchi and Stewart (2014), Soltani et al. (2012), Stew-
art et al. (2006), Busemeyer et al. (2005), and Usher and McClelland (2004).
Colman et al. (2007) and Amaldoss et al. (2008) consider simultaneous-
move games with ‘strategic asymmetric dominance’. This means that a
player has a strategy x that is strictly or weakly dominated by just one of
the other strategies, y. There is ‘strategic asymmetric dominance’ if the
presence of x makes the player more likely to choose y. This is similar to
the AE. Neither of these studies however consider the CE. Our strategic
environment differs from Colman et al. (2007) and Amaldoss et al. (2008)
in several ways. While they consider one-shot tacit coordination or ab-
stract games, we use an unstructured bargaining protocol, where subjects
can make as many offers and counter-offers as they like within the given
amount of time, can communicate via chat, and sign a binding agreement.
Thus coordination in our set-up is much less of an issue.7
3 The Attraction and Compromise Effects in Bar-
gaining
3.1 The Bargaining Game
A contract specifies how much money Player 1 and 2 gets. Player 1 and 2
negotiate either over a set of two contracts, denoted S = {A, B}, or over a
set of three contracts, T = {A, B, C}. The only difference is thus whether
contract C is feasible or not. We refer to the contracts in S as the base con-
tracts. The bargaining game based on a given contract set is referred to
simply as the ‘game’ (G). We refer to the game based on contract set S as
the ‘base game’ (BG). Contract C is referred to as the decoy, and the base
contract that the decoy is intended to make more focal is the target.
Player 1 and 2 negotiate which contract they should agree on. An
agreement is binding. Each player can make as many contract propos-
7We conjecture that using a one-shot instead of an unstructured bargaining game
would produce stronger AE and CE than what we observe, since subjects would be ‘des-
perate’ to use any clue in their environment in order to achieve coordination. This hy-
pothesis can be investigated in future work.
7
als as he or she likes, and freely decides when to do so, during the fixed
amount of time they have to negotiate. If they agree to a contract, each
player gets the corresponding payoffs, and the game ends. If they fail to
agree before time runs out, each player gets zero. There is no discount-
ing of time. The bargainers are constrained to either agree to one of the
contracts, or to disagree. They cannot make a binding agreement to ran-
domize between contracts.
3.2 Attraction and Compromise Effect
Denote by pSi the proportion of bargaining pairs who agree to contract i,
where i = A, B, when the contract set is S = {A, B}. Similarly, let pTj de-
note the proportion of bargaining pairs who agree to contract j = A, B, C
when the contract set is T = {A, B, C}. All these proportions are calcu-
lated out of all interactions, including those that ended in disagreement.
We define the AE and CE in terms of these aggregate contract agreement
proportions.
In what follows we assume that contract B is the target (as in Figure 2).
We say that a contract strictly dominates another if the former offers each
player a strictly higher amount of money than the latter, and that it is a
compromise if for each player its money payouts are the second highest,
while each of the other contracts gives one player its highest payoff and
the other its lowest.
Definition 1. (Attraction Effect, AE) Suppose the decoy C is strictly dominated
by B, but not by A. The AE arises when pTB > p
S
B.
Definition 2. (Compromise Effect, CE) Suppose the decoy C makes B a compro-
mise. The Compromise Effect arises when pTB > p
S
B.
We detect AE and CE in the data by comparing the proportions of agree-
ments on the target contract when the contract set is S and when it is T.
If the latter proportion is significantly larger than the former, we reject the
null hypothesis in favor of the alternative hypothesis, that there is an AE
or CE.
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4 The Bargaining Games
The bargaining games were constructed so as to allow us to test hypothe-
ses that we in the following section derive from theories of bargaining and
from existing empirical studies.
We collected data from 22 games, shown in Table 1 and Figure 3. There
are four Base Games (BG), 1, 4, 7, and 16 (marked in grey in the table), each
with contract sets S = {A, B}. In Game 1 (BG1) the two contracts are
‘symmetrically unequal’. In BG4 there is an equal and total earnings max-
imizing contract (B). BG7 is similar to BG4, except that the equal contract
is efficient but not total earnings maximizing.8 Finally, BG16 has a contract
that offers nearly equal payoffs. We can by adding different C contracts to
the base games, assess how the strength of the AE and CE depends on the
nature of the added contract C, and how these effects vary across different
base games.
We think of BG1 as one where CE and AE would be likely, if only as
symmetry-breaking devices. BG4 is one where we expect CE and AE to
be very unlikely (if a contract is equal and total-earnings maximizing, it is
expected to be strongly focal). With respect to BG4, BG7 reduces the total
payoffs of the equal contract, and thus its focality, so CE and AE become
more likely. BG16 then takes the equal contract in BG7 and makes it nearly
equal, so we expect CE and AE to be even more likely. We elaborate on
these hypotheses in Section 5 below.
We also collected data for two games, G15 and G22, where the C con-
tract was strictly dominated by both base contracts. We thought it would
be interesting to see if the presence of such clearly inferior contracts could
still exert a significant influence on the bargaining outcome.
5 Theory and Hypotheses
Our unstructured bargaining protocol gives the subjects complete free-
dom to make offers whenever they wish. This, with the fact that com-
munication via chat messages is allowed, and that any agreement can be
8If a contract maximizes the sum of the players’ money earnings, then it is also efficient
(Pareto optimal, defined in terms of the monetary earnings), but the converse is not true.
In BG4 the equal earnings contract is total earnings maximizing (and so efficient), while
in BG7 it is efficient but not total earnings maximizing.
9
Game Contracts Target Hypothesized effectA B C
1 (40,60) (60,40) – –
2 (40,60) (60,40) (80,20) B Compromise
3 (40,60) (60,40) (50,30) B Attraction
4 (40,120) (80,80) – –
5 (40,120) (80,80) (20,140) A Compromise
6 (40,120) (80,80) (20,100) A Attraction
7 (40,120) (60,60) – –
8 (40,120) (60,60) (5,155) A Compromise
9 (40,120) (60,60) (30,130) A Compromise
10 (40,120) (60,60) (120,40) B Compromise
11 (40,120) (60,60) (155,5) B Compromise
12 (40,120) (60,60) (70,40) B Compromise
13 (40,120) (60,60) (30,110) A Attraction
14 (40,120) (60,60) (50,50) B Attraction
15 (40,120) (60,60) (30,30) B Decoy strictly dominated by A and B
16 (40,120) (65,55) – –
17 (40,120) (65,55) (30,130) A Compromise
18 (40,120) (65,55) (120,40) B Compromise
19 (40,120) (65,55) (50,50) B Attraction
20 (40,120) (65,55) (55,45) B Attraction
21 (40,120) (65,55) (30,110) A Attraction
22 (40,120) (65,55) (30,30) B Decoy strictly dominated by A and B
Note: Base games (1,4,7,16) are in gray.
Table 1: The bargaining games.
made binding, makes predictions from cooperative bargaining theory (see
Thomson, 1994) relevant.
5.1 The IIA Axiom
We start by considering what the well-known axiom of Independence of Ir-
relevant Alternatives (IIA)—as defined in Nash (1950) and interpreted as a
positive statement about what will (not) happen in an actual bargaining
situation—implies for the AE and CE.
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(a) Games 1-3. (b) Games 4-6.
(c) Games 7-15. (d) Games 16-22.
Figure 3: Graphical illustration of the bargaining games.
Note: The axes measure (in experimental points) how much each Person (1 and 2) gets
for a given agreed contract. The base contracts A and B are in black. The decoy contract
C is in red (blue) when it is hypothesized to generate a CE (AE). It is in gray when it is
dominated by both A and B.
Definition 3. (IIA) If a contract, say B, where B ∈ S ⊂ T, is agreed on when
the contract set is T, then B is also the agreement when the contract set is S.
There is a quite simple intuition behind IIA. If the bargainers find a con-
tract, say B, attractive enough to agree on it when there is a large set of
alternative contracts (contract set T), then the bargainers should find B at
least as attractive when some of the ‘rival’ contracts are not available (con-
11
tract set S), and so they will again agree to B.9 In terms of our data, IIA
predicts that
pSA ≥ pTA and pSB ≥ pTB,
which clearly rules out both the AE and CE.10
Hypothesis 1. (IIA) There are neither AE nor CE in any of the bargaining
games, regardless of the contract payoffs.
5.2 The Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solutions
We next consider the predictions of two leading cardinal bargaining solu-
tions, the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution (Nash, 1950;
Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975), in what follows referred to as NBS and
KSBS, respectively. See Thomson (1994) for details. We assume through-
out this section that the bargainers are rational, self-regarding, and risk
neutral, and that this is common knowledge.11
The NBS and KSBS assume that the set of feasible payoffs is convex,
which does not hold in our finite set-up (recall that randomization is not
allowed). We therefore consider extensions of the original solutions to a
finite set of feasible payoffs.
5.2.1 The Extension of the Nash Bargaining Solution
Mariotti (1998) extends the NBS to a finite set of feasible payoffs.12 His
solution selects the contract(s) with the highest Nash product, which, un-
9We note that even though Nash (1950) assumes a convex set of payoffs, the IIA con-
dition is independent of whether the set of feasible payoffs is convex or not. For example,
Mariotti (1998), whose extension of the Nash Bargaining Solution we consider in the next
section, also assumes IIA, but on a non-convex domain.
10Since, as we shall explain below, in our experiment subjects are rematched from
round to round, we do not observe the same pairs bargaining over the two sets of con-
tracts, so we expect IIA to hold only in a probabilistic sense. Suppose IIA holds for each
possible pair in the population; then any pair that agrees on a base contract in contract
set T agrees on the same contract in set S. The actual frequency of agreements on the
base contract can occasionally be lower in S than in T because we are looking at a sam-
ple rather than at all possible pairs in the population, but it should not be systematically
lower. If it is, IIA is violated.
11The restrictiveness of these assumptions is discussed below.
12Another extension of the NBS to a non-convex domain is Conley and Wilkie (1996),
12
der our assumptions on preferences, coincides with the product of money
payoffs; if there is more than one such maximizer, the solution consists of
the entire set of maximizers. The interpretation of a set-valued solution is
that the final agreement will lie in the set.
Some straightforward calculations reveal that the NBS predicts con-
tracts {A, B} in BG1–G3, contract B in BG4–G6, and contract A in BG7–
G22, except G10 and G18, where the prediction is {A, C}.
Mariotti’s solution never generates an AE, since a dominated contract
always has a smaller Nash product than the contract that dominates it.
The same is true for the CE if there is only one contract that maximizes
the Nash product. Note, however that the solution is {A, B} in both BG1
and G2. Since Mariotti’s model is silent on what the empirical agreement
proportions on A and B will then be, an observation that there are signif-
icantly more agreements on B in G2 than in BG1, is not inconsistent with
the model’s predictions.
In order to deal with this indeterminacy, we appeal to the principle of
insufficient reason and introduce the following auxiliary assumption.
Assumption 1. If the solution contains two or more contracts, then the bargain-
ers agree on each of them with the same probability.
With this assumption, Mariotti’s model predicts that there will not be a
CE.13
Hypothesis 2. ((Nash Bargaining Solution; Mariotti, 1998) There is no AE,
and, when Assumption 1 holds, no CE in any of the games.
While the NBS predictions for the individual games clearly depend on our
assumption that agents are self-interested and risk neutral, the prediction
that there is no AE and no CE holds for other preferences, such as inequity
but they assume that the set is comprehensive, which means that the players can dispose
of utilities (see Thomson, 1994). This is not possible in our experiment.
13The Nash product of a contract does not depend on what other contracts are avail-
able. Thus, either i) C does not maximize the Nash product in T, in which case the so-
lutions for S and T must be identical (and, if the solution is set-valued, frequencies of
individual contracts are unchanged because of assumption 1), ii) C is the only contract
that maximizes the Nash product in T, or iii) C and one or more other contracts maximize
the Nash product in T, in which case any contract in the solution for S must still be part
of the solution for T, and its predicted frequency must decline by assumption 1.
13
averse or social welfare preferences (see Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Charness
and Rabin, 2002).14
5.2.2 The Extension of the Kalai Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution
Nagahisa and Tanaka (2002) extend the KSBS to a finite domain.15 Their
solution selects the contract(s) that maximize the payoff of the player get-
ting the lower proportion of his or her maximal possible (‘ideal’) payoff.16
As in Mariotti (1998), the solution can be set-valued, in which case we
again invoke Assumption 1.
The KSBS predictions for our games are as follows (see the Appendix).
BG1: {A, B}; G2: B; G3: {A, B}; BG4 = G5 = G6: B; BG7 = G8 = G9: A; G10
= G11: B; G12 = G13 = G14 = G15: A; BG16 = G17: A; G18: B; G19-G22: A.
As for the NBS, the KSBS extension cannot generate any AE. This fol-
lows since adding a strictly dominated decoy does not affect the ideal
point, so the solution remains the same. The KSBS extension can, how-
ever, generate a CE.
Hypothesis 3. (Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution; Nagahisa and Tanaka,
2002): There is no AE in any of the bargaining games. However, there is for some
games a CE.
If we consider the KSBS solutions (see above), it is clear that there are CEs
in BG1 and G2, BG7 and G10, BG7 and G11, and BG16 and G18. In all the
other games there is no CE.17 As stated, most of these CEs do not depend
on whether Assumption 1 holds or not: in fact, in all games, except BG1
and G2, contract B is the unique solution for contract set T but not part of
the solution for S. This is the ‘strongest’ possible form of CE that can arise.
14The comparison of Nash products that leads to this conclusion (see previous foot-
note) holds for any fixed preferences.
15Anant et al. (1990), Conley and Wilkie (1991), and Hougaard and Tvede (2003) also
dispense with convexity, but assume properties of the feasible set (comprehensiveness
and certain regularity conditions) that are not satisfied in our bargaining experiments.
16Geometrically, the solution(s) lie on the highest Leontief level curve, with kinks on
the line connecting the disagreement point (the origin in our case) and the ideal point
(the point of maximum payoffs to the bargainers). See the Appendix for more details.
17In some cases, the absence of a CE is due to the fact that the decoy is not extreme
enough to change the solution (cf. BG4 and G5; BG7 and G12). In others, the target
contract is already uniquely selected in the base game (cf. BG7, G8, and G9, and BG16
and G17).
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Recall again our self-interest assumption. The NBS predictions (that
the decoy is ineffective in increasing the frequency of the target in all cases)
are robust to assuming other preferences. In contrast, the KSBS predictions
may change if we instead assume inequity averse social preferences.
5.3 Ordinal Bargaining Solutions
We next consider models where only the players’ ranking of the contracts
matters. By definition these models disregard cardinal payoff informa-
tion, such as whether a contract equalizes or maximizes total earnings.
Although our experiment makes such information available, the ordinal
models may still be relevant if participants tend to rely mostly or exclu-
sively on ordinal relationships between the contracts. Whether they do
this or not is an empirical issue that our experiment will shed light on.
5.3.1 The Fallback Bargaining Solution
According to the Fallback Bargaining Solution (see Brams and Kilgour,
2001; Kıbrıs and Sertel, 2007; de Clippel and Eliaz, 2012), each player has
a strict ranking of the contracts. The players first consider if a contract is
ranked first by both players; if so, they agree to it. Otherwise, they look
for a contract that is ranked either first or second by both players. If such a
contract exists, it becomes the agreement. If not, they consider if there are
contracts that are ranked first, second, or third, by each player, and so on.
The Fallback Solution is not necessarily single-valued. For example,
if there are only two contracts, A and B, with the players ranking them
differently (such as BG1), then the solution is the set {A, B}. As before,
such a set-valued solution yields an empirically indeterminate prediction.
In what follows we therefore again invoke Assumption 1. The Fallback
Solution then generates an AE and CE. Suppose Player 1’s ranking is A 
B, and 2 has the opposite ranking. If they bargain over S, the fallback
solution is {A, B}. Suppose then the set of contracts is T and that contract
C is dominated by B. Player 1’s ranking is B  C  A, while 2’s is A 
B  C. The decoy drives a wedge between Player 1’s ranking of A and
B, and A is now relatively worse for player 1 than before. The Fallback
solution is B. Similarly, there can be a CE. If a contract C is added such
that player 1’s ranking is C  B  A, and 2’s is A  B  C, the solution is
again B. For player 1 the decoy pushes A to the bottom.
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Hypothesis 4. (Fallback Bargaining Solution): There is an AE or a CE in all
possible cases.
5.3.2 The Ordinal Egalitarian Bargaining Solution
The Ordinal Egalitarian Solution (OES), due to Conley and Wilkie (2012),
selects the middle ranked contract among the set of efficient contracts if
there is an odd number of contracts, and otherwise selects the 50/50 lot-
tery over the two middle ranked contracts (i.e., randomizes over A and B
for contract set S).18 The following is then immediate.
Hypothesis 5. (Ordinal Egalitarian Solution; Conley and Wilkie, 2012) There
is a CE in all possible cases, but never an AE.
5.4 Focal Point-Based Hypotheses
The theories described above are cooperative, so it is natural to also con-
sider non-cooperative theories. Due to the complexity of our unstructured
bargaining game (which allows players to freely decide when to move and
what offers and counter-offers to make), it is however not possible to ob-
tain clear predictions.19
What we will do instead is to refine our predictions by introducing the
concept of a focal point (Schelling, 1960), by which we mean features of
a contract’s payoffs, or relationships between these payoffs, that make a
contract appealing. We hypothesize that there are two main sources of fo-
cality: payoffs (salient properties of the contracts’ payoffs), and choice set,
based on dominance and compromise relationships between the contracts.
18The difference between the OES and the Fallback in solution lies in whether the solu-
tion considers strictly dominated contracts. The Fallback solution does this, since adding
a strictly dominated contract decreases some player’s relative ranking of the non-target
contract, and this generates an AE. As stated, the OES by construction disregards domi-
nated options, and so is immune to this effect.
19Sharper theoretical predictions can be obtained if one imposes a more restrictive bar-
gaining protocol. For example, Anbarci (2006) analyzes the equilibrium outcomes of a
game with a finite set of alternatives, assuming that only ordinal preference information
is available. Under his Alternate Strike protocol, the players take turns in proposing and
rejecting outcomes. A rejected alternative is removed, and if an agreement is not reached
before then the last remaining alternative becomes the agreement. The equilibria of this
game generate attraction and compromise effects.
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Our conjecture is that the AE and CE operate through the second chan-
nel, but that they interact and potentially ‘compete’ with payoffs for the
players’ attention. Ceteris paribus, the stronger the payoff-based source of
focality is, the less likely the AE and CE are to matter.
5.4.1 One of the Base Contracts Offers Equal Payoffs
Consider first the case where there is a base contract with equal and total
earnings maximizing payoffs (BG4–G6). Suppose, as has been found in
existing research (see for example the references above), that these proper-
ties will be perceived by bargainers as strongly focal. Then we may expect
that a vast majority agree to this contract in the base game, regardless of
whether it, or the other unequal payoff contract, is the target.20 This gives
part a of the hypothesis stated below. The second, slightly stronger, part
of the hypothesis states that the AE and CE also disappear if the contract
is efficient but not necessarily total earnings maximizing.
Hypothesis 6. (Equal payoff base contract) Suppose one of the base contracts
offers equal payoffs to the players. a) If this contract maximizes total payoffs,
there is no AE or CE regardless of which base contract is the target. b) The AE
and CE disappear as soon as the equal contract is efficient.
According to part a), there are no AE and CE in BG4–G6, while they may
be present in BG7–G15. Part b) states that there are no AE and CE in BG4–
G15. A variant of Hypothesis 6 is that it may not be possible to raise agree-
ments on the equal contract via an AE or CE, but it will be possible to raise
agreements on the other unequal base contract by targeting it.
5.4.2 No Equal Payoff Base Contract
If no base contract offers equal payoffs, the payoff-based focal criterion of
equality that potentially ‘competes’ with the AE and CE is removed. A
conjecture is that this makes the AE and CE significant.
Hypothesis 7. (No equal payoff base contract) Suppose no base contract offers
equal payoffs. Then the AE and CE are significant, for both base contracts.
20Intuitively, the equal contract is so focal that that there is no room for making it more
focal by making it a target, and the high focality also implies that one cannot ‘pull’ agree-
ments away from it by targeting the unequal rival base contract.
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According to this hypothesis, there will be AEs and CEs in BG1–G3 and
BG16–G21.
5.4.3 Nearly Versus Exactly Equal Payoffs
We also wish to compare the AE and CE when instead of perfectly equal
payoffs, a base contract offers only nearly equal payoffs (BG16). The com-
parison of BG16 and BG7 will inform us if the focality of perfect equality
is stronger than focality due to inequality minimization.
The null hypothesis is that there is no difference between BG7 and
BG16, and no difference in the associated AE and CE for either base con-
tract. The alternative hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 8. (Perfect vs. nearly equal payoffs) There are ceteris paribus more
agreements on an exactly equal than on a nearly equal payoff contract. Moreover,
the AE and CE for either base contract are stronger with a nearly equal contract
than with an exactly equal contract.
This hypothesis implies that there should be a significant difference be-
tween BG7 and BG16. Moreover, the AE and CE for either base contract
should differ between G9 and G17, G10 and G18, and G13 and G21.
5.4.4 Additional Hypotheses About Decoy Properties
In addition to the hypotheses stated above, we introduced games that al-
lowed us to explore some additional aspects of the AE and CE.
First, we hypothesized that in order for a significant AE to arise the
decoy must not possess more potentially focal properties than the target
contract, such as offering more equal payoffs – otherwise it could ‘steal’
agreements from the target, and eliminate the AE. We test this by compar-
ing BG16–G19 and BG16–G20. The target is the same and offers unequal
payoffs, while the decoy is either equal or nearly equal.21 Second, we
wished to investigate if the strength of the CE depends on how attractive
the decoy itself is. We conjecture that a very extreme decoy is ignored
(because of its implausibility as an agreement), and hence there is no CE.
21There is another difference between the two pairs. In pair BG16–G20 the target offers
equal gains relative to the decoy, but the other pair does not. This might also serve to
make the target more attractive in BG16 and G20 than BG16 and G19. Unfortunately our
games do not allow us to distinguish between these two hypotheses.
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Another possibility is that the more extreme the decoy is, the more attrac-
tive it makes the target. We examine this by comparing G8 and G9 (where
the compromise is contract A), and G10, G11, and G12 (the compromise is
B).
Finally, we wished to consider games with contracts C that were dom-
inated not just by a single but both base contracts. These are not decoys as
we have defined them (a decoy is dominated by only one base contract). A
natural null hypothesis is that there is no effect of adding these contracts.
An alternative hypothesis is that such C contracts can still affect behavior
by being closer to one of the base contracts, and in this sense still act as a
‘decoy’ for that base contract. We test this by comparing BG7 with G15,
and BG16 with G22.
6 The Experiment
6.1 Design and Procedures
The experiment was conducted at the Centre for Decision Research and
Experimental Economics (CeDEx) of the University of Nottingham (United
Kingdom). 272 subjects participated in 17 sessions (16 participants per
session). We used the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) to program and
conduct the experiment, and ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) to recruit the partici-
pants. Subjects earned on average £13 (including a show-up fee of £4) and
each session lasted just below an hour.
Upon arriving to the lab, subjects were allocated to different desks sep-
arated by partitions. They received printed instructions (see Appendix)
which were read aloud by the experimenter. Each subject encountered the
22 bargaining games in a different order. Subjects did not know the con-
tent of the 22 games in advance, and only knew that, in each game, they
would be matched at random with a different co-participant. Since differ-
ent subjects encounter the games in a different order, learning effects in
the data affect all games to a similar extent and hence should not lead to
systematic aggregate effects that would bias comparisons across games.22
22We designed the matching protocol algorithm in order to minimize the re-matching
between the same participants in order to curtail repeated-game effects. More details
on this algorithm can be found in Galeotti et al. (2016). Since as mentioned earlier we
rematched subjects in each round it would be unlikely to observe the same pairs negoti-
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In each game that a subject encountered, one randomly selected subject
was referred to as Person 1 and the other as Person 2. Hence, a subject
could be Person 1 in some games, and Person 2 in others. We used these
player labels to simplify the description of and reference to the contracts.
When two subjects were matched, it was randomly decided which feasible
payoffs were assigned to Person 1 or 2. As an example, G4 came in two
versions: Person 1 has feasible payoffs 40 and 80 (so 2 has 80 and 120), and
Person 1 has payoffs 80 and 120 (2 has 40 and 80). We analysed the data
and found no significant effect of the labels on behavior. In particular, the
earnings of subjects labeled Person 1 and 2 are not significantly different
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.687).23 When we analyze the data, we
thus pool the data across player labels.
Each pair of subjects were presented with a set of either two or three
contracts. The contracts were displayed, in the same random order, on the
matched subjects’ computer screens. In each game subjects were given 120
seconds to negotiate. They made contract proposals by clicking with their
mouse on a contract, and could write free chat messages to each other.
Subjects could write as many or as few messages as they wanted. They
were asked not to reveal their identity, physically threaten the other sub-
ject, or discuss what might happen outside the lab. Subjects were informed
that failure to comply would result in exclusion.
Figure 4 shows the computer screen the subjects saw. Note that the
contracts were not given any particular labels. In order to reach an agree-
ment, subjects had to click on the same contract. The agreement was bind-
ing and could not be changed. As long as subjects had not clicked on the
same contract, they could withdraw their contract proposal or change it
with a new one, in real time and as many times as they wanted. Subjects
were also free to make no proposals at all. If no agreement was reached
before the end of the 120 seconds, the two paired subjects earned no points
from that game.
ating over both the set S = {A, B} and T = {A, B, C}. As a result, IIA can only hold in a
probabilistic sense.
23Similarly, we find no labeling effect on who first starts the chat (p = 0.421) or sends a
proposal (p = 0.461).
20
Figure 4: Decision screen.
At the end of the experiment, the computer randomly selected three of the
twenty-two rounds (the same for all subjects in a given session) for pay-
ment. Points were converted in pounds at the exchange rate of 20 points
= £1.
7 Experimental Findings
7.1 Overview
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the 22 games. The feasible con-
tracts for each game are shown in the ‘Contracts’ column, followed by
the percentage of bargaining pairs who did not reach an agreement, and
who agreed on the contract A, B, and C, respectively (columns ‘Disagree’,
‘Agree on A’, ‘Agree on B’, and ‘Agree on C’). Recall that since we found
no effects of labels (Person 1 vs 2) on behavior, we pool the data across
player labels 1 and 2.24
Table 2 also shows how long it on average took for people to reach an
agreement (‘Time to agree’ column). Note that pairs who disagreed are
excluded from this average.
A visual representation of how agreements (and disagreements) vary
between each BG1, BG4, BG7, and BG16 and the other games is given in
24Note that G1 and 10 are symmetric, so as a result of the pooling the agreement pro-
portions on the unequal payoff contracts are identical.
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Game Contracts Disagree Agree Agree Agree Time toA B C on A on B on C agree (in sec.)
1 (40,60) (60,40) 8.09% 45.96% 45.96% 0% 89.93
2 (40,60) (60,40) (80,20) 6.62% 35.29% 55.15% 2.94% 90.21
3 (40,60) (60,40) (50,30) 7.35% 38.24% 52.21% 2.21% 88.38
4 (40,120) (80,80) 0% 2.21% 97.79% 0% 34.71
5 (40,120) (80,80) (20,140) 0.74% 1.47% 97.06% 0.74% 35.63
6 (40,120) (80,80) (20,100) 0% 1.47% 98.53% 0% 37.09
7 (40,120) (60,60) 0.74% 7.35% 91.91% 0% 63.67
8 (40,120) (60,60) (5,155) 5.15% 8.09% 86.76% 0% 63.28
9 (40,120) (60,60) (30,130) 1.47% 11.03% 87.5% 0% 53.38
10 (40,120) (60,60) (120,40) 1.47% 3.68% 91.18% 3.68% 49.04
11 (40,120) (60,60) (155,5) 0.74% 7.35% 91.18% 0.74% 52.86
12 (40,120) (60,60) (70,40) 2.21% 4.41% 91.18% 2.21% 51.23
13 (40,120) (60,60) (30,110) 3.68% 9.56% 86.76% 0% 54.19
14 (40,120) (60,60) (50,50) 3.68% 5.88% 90.44% 0% 44.34
15 (40,120) (60,60) (30,30) 2.94% 7.35% 89.71% 0% 52.19
16 (40,120) (65,55) 7.35% 17.65% 75% 0% 73.51
17 (40,120) (65,55) (30,130) 6.62% 17.65% 75% 0.74% 65.04
18 (40,120) (65,55) (120,40) 5.88% 5.15% 87.5% 1.47% 50.35
19 (40,120) (65,55) (50,50) 4.41% 8.82% 72.79% 13.97% 57.58
20 (40,120) (65,55) (55,45) 0.74% 11.03% 88.24% 0% 55.92
21 (40,120) (65,55) (30,110) 2.21% 17.65% 79.41% 0.74% 74.83
22 (40,120) (65,55) (30,30) 2.21% 12.5% 84.56% 0.74% 61.35
Notes: For each game there are 136 observations (number of pairs). Base games are shaded in gray. The
contract labels A, B, and C were not used in the experiment.
Table 2: Aggregate bargaining outcomes.
Figure 5.
To test our hypotheses, we conduct Wilcoxon signed-rank tests using
session averages as the units of observation to account for the correlation
across bargaining pairs (as described earlier, subjects played 22 games and
were rematched from round to round).25 Our hypotheses predict an effect
in a particular direction (the AE and CE are directional effects), except
in cases where C is dominated by both A and B. Hence, all statistical tests
regarding AEs and CEs are one-tailed (this is specified when we report the
results). In all the other cases where we do not have a-priori or directional
25As a robustness check, we also conducted parametric tests (available from the au-
thors upon request). In particular, we checked the statistical significance of marginal ef-
fects computed from multinomial logit regressions on the pair-level data of each ‘block’
of games (i.e., games BG1–G3, BG4–G6, BG7–G15, and BG16–G22). The dependent vari-
able is the outcome of the bargaining (disagreement, agreement on A or agreement on
B), while the independent variables are dummies for the different games. Standard er-
rors are clustered at the session level. The results of parametric and non-parametric tests
are qualitatively similar. Full details are available from the authors upon request.
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Note: the difference in the agreement rate on C between a game and its corre-
sponding base game is obtained by setting the agreement rate on C equal to
zero in the base game.
Figure 5: Changes in agreements on A, B, C and disagreements for each
game, compared to the base game
hypotheses, the tests are two-tailed. Significance is evaluated at the 5%
level, unless otherwise specified.
We think of the AE and CE as effects that benefit the target, so in or-
der to claim that an AE or CE has occurred, we require that the relative
frequency of agreements on the target increases, computed as a fraction of
all interactions, not just those interactions that end in an agreement. Intu-
itively, in order for B to be favoured by the addition of C, B should become
more popular overall, not just as a fraction of the interactions that ended
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in an agreement. For example, if B is a job applicant we think of the in-
troduction of C as favouring B only if B becomes more likely to be hired
overall (not just conditional on the vacancy being filled) as a result of C
being added to the shortlist.26
We first observe that there are games where there is a significant AE
(16–20) and CE (1–2 and 16–18). More specifically, regarding the CE we
find that contract B is agreed on more frequently in G2 compared to BG1
(one-tailed test, p = 0.050). A similar pattern is observed when we com-
pare G18 and BG16 (one-tailed test, p = 0.007). The AE in G20 is also
significant (one-tailed test, p = 0.009).
Finding 1. There are games where the AE and CE are significant.
These findings reject IIA (Hypothesis 1), the NBS predictions (Hypothesis
2), and the KSBS’ AE predictions (Hypothesis 3). Regarding the ordinal
bargaining models, both the Fallback and OES predictions of a CE in all
games (Hypotheses 4 and 5) are clearly rejected. Moreover, neither man-
ages to capture the observed AE pattern well (recall that the Fallback so-
lution predicts there should be an AE in all games, and the OES predicts
the exact opposite).
7.2 Games with an Equal Payoff Contract
In order to explain why the CE and AE are observed in some but not other
games we need to consider in more detail the contracts’ money payoffs.
We first consider games with a contract that offers the players exactly the
same earnings. The following is immediate from Table 2.
Finding 2. There are no significant AE or CE in any games with an equal and
total payoff maximizing contract (Games 4–6). If the equal payoff contract is not
total payoff maximizing (Games 7–15), a decoy targeting the other contract has
some ability to reduce agreements on the equal contract, but not to significantly
increase the frequency of agreements on the target.
This finding strongly support Hypothesis 6, part a. An equal and total-
earnings maximizing contract is extremely focal, and introducing a decoy
that targets the unequal contract has no effect. The agreement rates on A
26We also analyzed the data excluding the interactions that ended in a disagreement.
The results are qualitatively the same, and are available from the authors upon request.
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and B are not statistically different between BG4, G5 and G6 (one-tailed
tests, p > 0.1 for all comparisons).
In BG7, subjects still agree mostly on the equal contract B, but less of-
ten than in BG4 (p = 0.033). This confirms the earlier finding that the
focality of an equal and efficient payoff contract depends on whether the
contract possesses the additional property of maximizing total earnings
(see Galeotti et al., 2016).
Our data also support Hypothesis 6, part b. A decoy targetting the un-
equal contract A has no effect on the target (and thus there is no CE or AE
according to our definition), but may decrease the frequency of the equal
contract. The decrease in the frequency of the equal contract is (weakly)
significant in G8 and G13 but not in G9 (one-tailed tests, p = 0.051, 0.079
and 0.140 respectively). Note that the decoy itself is never chosen in these
three games, and thus the decrease in the agreements on the equal con-
tract translates into an increase in the frequency of disagreement. Finally,
a decoy targetting the equal contract B has no significant effect on either
the target or the alternative contract.27
The finding that an equal contract is very focal and there is conse-
quently little room for a significant CE or AE to occur (this is particularly
true of BG4, where almost 100% of agreements are on B) is quite intu-
itive.28 What may be less obvious is that the decoys did not manage to
significantly increase the frequency of agreements on the other contract
(A) even though there is plenty of room for that to occur.
We also observe that both the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions
systematically fail to capture the focality of the equal payoff contracts; re-
call that in BG7–G15 both solutions almost always predict the unequal
contract A, while a vast majority of bargainers agree to the equal contract
B.29
27The only exception is G10, where we observe a significant drop in the agreements on
A (one-tailed test, p = 0.020). This is due to the fact that, in comparison to BG7, some
agreements on A are replaced by agreements on C.
28 The data in Galeotti et al. (2016) showed a significant CE in some (but not all) games
with an equal but not total-earnings maximizing contract. Such contracts were less focal
than in the current paper, and this leaves more room for their frequency to increase via
a CE. This lower focality could be due to game differences (the earlier paper included
games where the equal contract offers much lower total earnings than the unequal one)
or to different subject pools being used.
29An obvious way to improve the prediction of the models is to replace self-interested
preferences with inequity-averse (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000)
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7.3 Games without an Equal Payoff Contract
7.3.1 The Case of a Nearly Equal Payoff Contract
Let us first consider if it matters whether a contract offers exactly, or only
nearly equal payoffs. We compare BG7 and BG16.
Finding 3. Observed agreements in BG16, which has a nearly equal payoff con-
tract, are significantly different from those in BG7, which has an equal payoff
contract.
This supports Hypothesis 8. In BG7 more than 90% of bargaining pairs
agree to the equal contract, while only 75% do so in BG16. The agree-
ment rate on B drops by about 17% in BG16 compared to BG7 (p = 0.001),
while the agreement rate on A increases by about 10% (p = 0.009). A
similar finding for an experimental mini-Ultimatum game is reported in
Gu¨th et al. (2001). One interpretation is that the property of offering equal
payoffs to the players confers focality over and beyond what it gets from
being inequality minimizing.
Not only are agreements in BG7 and BG16 different, but the corre-
sponding AEs and CEs are also different in magnitude. The nearly equal
payoffs contract (65,55) can be made significantly more agreed on by mak-
ing it a compromise (G18 vs. BG16; one-tailed test, p = 0.007). Similarly,
the same contract can be made more popular by introducing a decoy that
is strictly dominated (G20 vs. BG16; one-tailed test, p = 0.009). We sum-
marize this in the following finding:
Finding 4. Unlike BG7, BG16 has significant AE and CE (G18 and G20), but
only for the nearly equal base contract, not for the more unequal base contract.
This again supports Hypothesis 8. One interpretation is that there is more
‘room’ for the AE and CE to work in BG16 than in BG7. In BG16 it is
therefore possible to raise agreements on the equal contract significantly
via the AE and CE. Note that, while there are significant AEs and CEs for
the nearly equal base contract, it is still not possible to make the other,
more unequal, base contract more attractive to the bargainers (cf games
BG17 and G21).
preferences, or allow for a mix of these different preference types.
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7.3.2 Two Symmetrically Unequal Payoff Contracts
Consider now BG1, with two unequal base contracts, (40,60) and (60,40).
The CE is significant (cf. G2): subjects agree more on B than in BG1 (one-
tailed test, p = 0.050 for B). The AE (G3) is not significant (one-tailed test,
p = 0.112), although there is a marginal decrease in the frequency on A
(p = 0.070).
Finding 5. In BG1, with two symmetrically unequal contracts, there is a signif-
icant CE (G2), but no significant AE (G3).
This supports Hypothesis 7 for the CE. With respect to the AE, the ob-
served increase in the frequency on contract B goes in the predicted direc-
tion, but is not large enough to achieve statistical significance.
We find the latter somewhat surprising, since we thought that subjects
would have been keen to use any ‘symmetry breaker’ they could find to
resolve the coordination problem.
7.4 Decoy Properties
In G19 the decoy offers equal payoffs, 14% agree on it, and fewer (although
not significantly, p = 0.509) people agree on the target contract B than in
the absence of the decoy (BG16). The decoy is thus, if anything, ‘counter–
productive’. In G20, the base contracts are the same as in G19, but the
decoy is now only nearly equal. We observe a significant increase in agree-
ments on B (one-sided test, p = 0.009) and a decrease in agreements on A
(one-sided test, p = 0.051).
Finding 6. The AE for BG16 with a nearly equal payoff contract is significantly
stronger when the decoy offers only nearly as opposed to exactly equal payoffs (cf
G20 vs. G19).
We think it is striking how such a little difference in the payoffs offered
by the decoy makes a significant difference for the sign and magnitude of
the AE. This suggest there is a significant behavioral difference between
exactly and nearly equal payoffs not only for base contracts, but also for
the decoy.30
30As already remarked earlier, we cannot with the current set of games say whether
the significant AE in G20 is due to the target offering each player the same gain relative
to the decoy, or whether it is because the decoy offers unequal earnings and hence does
not compete in focality with the target.
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We next consider if the strength of the CE depends on how extreme
the decoy is. G8 and G9, and G10, G11 and G12, all based on BG7 with
base contracts (40,120),(60,60), differ in this respect. In none of the cases
is there any CE, due to the overwhelming focality of contract (60,60). We
unfortunately do not have games that allow us to examine the effect of the
extremeness of the decoy for other base games.
We finally consider the role played by contracts that are strictly domi-
nated by both base contracts. In G15 and G22 the contract (30,30) is strictly
dominated by both base contracts. In G22 this makes contract (65,55) more
frequently agreed on (p = 0.049), and (40,120) less, although not signifi-
cantly so (p = 0.120). Since (30,30) is dominated by both base contracts,
this is not a ‘standard’ AE. One conjecture for why adding (30,30) makes
agreements on (65,55) more attractive is that (30,30) is closer to (65,55) than
to (40,120). In this sense (30,30) serves as reference point for the bargain-
ers.31 G15 is similar to G22, but in the former game there is no significant
effect of adding a dominated contract, since the focality of the equal payoff
contract (60,60) in BG7 is already so high.
Finding 7. Adding a contract C that is dominated by both base contracts, but
closer to one of them, say B, can raise agreements on B at the expense of A, if
neither base contract is strongly focal, as for the AE.
This suggests that the forces that influence the AE based on reference
points that are not decoys are of the same nature as for proper decoys
that are only dominated by one base contract.
7.5 Agreement Times
Although we are primarily interested in final bargaining outcomes, it is in-
teresting to look also at the agreement times (cf Table 2). Note that there is
no time pressure in our experiment other than the deadline. Provided that
subjects agree on a contract before the deadline, they receive the points
specified in the agreed contract (without any discounting); furthermore,
even if they agree on a contract, they need to wait until the 120 seconds
run out before starting the next round. In spite of this, there are clear dif-
ferences in agreement times between the base games. In BG4 the strong
31It is also the case that agreeing on (65,55) gives players more similar gains than
(40,120), relative to (30,30). Our data do not allow us to distinguish between the rela-
tive roles of closeness and equality of gains.
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focality of the equal and total earnings maximizing contract is confirmed
by the very fast agreement time (on average 34.71 secs.).
In BG7, where the equal contract does not maximize total earnings, it
takes almost twice as long on average to reach an agreement (63.67 secs.),
and this difference is highly significant (p = 0.002). In BG16, the lack of
an exactly equal contract makes the problem even harder than BG7, and
it takes slightly longer to reach an agreement (73.51 secs.), although not
significantly so (p = 0.177). Moreover, unlike in BG4 and BG7, in BG16
the proportion of interactions that end in disagreement is not negligible
(7.35%). Finally, BG1 is the most difficult of all base games: there are two
unequal allocations and nothing to choose between them. As a result, this
base game has both the highest average time to agree (89.93 secs.), and the
highest frequency of disagreement (8.09%). The average agreement time
in BG1 is significantly higher than in BG4, BG7, and BG16 (p < 0.01 in all
cases).
How does the addition of a third contract affect agreement times? It
has no significant effect in the two extreme cases, where there is either a
very clear answer to the question “what should the agreement be?” (G5-
G6 compared to BG4), or no clear answer at all (G2-G3 compared to BG1).
The effect of adding a third contract to BG7 is mixed: it reduces the
time it takes to agree on average (pooling G8-G15 versus BG7, p = 0.044)
but also increases the frequency of disagreement (p = 0.012).
Adding a third contract appears to help bargainers in the case of BG16,
where one contract is nearly equal and the other maximizes total earnings
(pooling G17-G22 and comparing the average time to agree with BG16,
agreement times are shorter, p = 0.009, and disagreement is not more
frequent).
Thus, the evidence suggests that adding a decoy may speed up the
process of reaching an agreement in some cases, possibly by providing
reasons to choose one base contract over the other (cf. Shafir et al., 1993).
8 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper reports on what we believe is the first systematic experimen-
tal investigation of the Attraction and Compromise Effects (AE and CE) in
bargaining, namely the propensity of bargainers to agree to an intermedi-
ate option (CE) or to an option that dominates another option (AE).
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We observe that the power of the AE and CE in bargaining is funda-
mentally constrained by the payoff focality of the feasible agreements. If
an agreement is strongly payoff focal, which in our data set means that it
offers the bargainers exactly equal and efficient payoffs, then this contract
is very likely to be agreed on, and this wipes out any CE or AE.32 On the
other hand, if no feasible contract offers the players exactly equal payoffs,
then the CE becomes significant. For the AE to be significant, additional
conditions on the payoffs need to be met, so in this sense the AE is less
robust than the CE. We believe that our finding that “context matters in
bargaining” is of interest to theorists and practitioners alike.
To what extent can we interpret these findings as suggesting that the
AE and CE are generic bargaining phenomena? Our data suggests that
this depends on whether the bargainers can achieve an efficient outcome
that is known to perfectly equalize the bargainers’ payoffs. The CE and AE
become significant (under some additional conditions) as soon as there is
a slight inequality in the payoffs of the least unequal contract. One inter-
pretation of this is that bargaining behavior when there is an option that
offers perfectly equal payoffs may not be robust to slight perturbations in
these payoffs.
There are several important features of the experimental bargaining
environment, whose impact on the importance of the AE and CE can be
studied in future work. First, the players’ monetary payoffs are commonly
known. This may not be a good assumption for many real bargaining set-
tings. For example, each bargainer may know only his or her own pay-
offs from a given agreement, see for example Roth and Murnighan (1982).
One conjecture is that private payoff information weakens the focality of
the main “competitor” to the CE and AE, namely contracts with equal
payoffs, since it is less likely to become common knowledge that such a
contract exists. Of course, another effect of imprecise payoff information
is that it may not become common knowledge that a particular contract is
dominated or a compromise. The net effect on the AE and CE is therefore
an empirical issue.
Second, in our experiment ‘time is not money’ (since it does not matter
when some agreement is reached, only that it is reached before time runs
32The earlier paper, Galeotti et al. (2016), which only examined the CE, did find some
evidence of a significant CE with an equal and efficient target contract (see also footnote
28).
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out). Depending on the specifics of the bargaining situation, this may be
unrealistic. There can be opportunity costs of bargaining, or the surplus
may ‘shrink’ due to discounting or physical decay. A conjecture is that
when time is money (see Rubinstein, 1982) players are more likely to be
influenced by the AE and CE, since they wish to identify and reach an
agreement quickly. Of course, the same considerations may strengthen
the focality of equal payoff contracts, so it may continue to matter whether
such contracts are feasible or not.
Third, our entire investigation has been based on a finite set up with a
small number of feasible agreements. Of course, many real bargaining sit-
uations have a very large set of possible agreements. A question for future
research is whether context effects of the type studied in this paper (bar-
gainers choosing an intermediate alternative, or an alternative that dom-
inates others) would become stronger or weaker in such more complex
situations.
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Appendix
Appendix 1: Instructions
INSTRUCTIONS
Welcome and thank you for taking part in this decision making experi-
ment. The amount of money you earn will depend on your decisions and
the decisions made by the other participants in the room. Please do not
talk to the other participants during the experiment. Everyone gets the
same instructions, and all decisions are anonymous. If anyone has any
questions, please raise your hand, and we will help you.
THE TASK
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Rounds
There are 22 rounds. In each round you will be paired with one of the
other participants in the room. It has been randomly decided by the com-
puter which participants in the room you will be paired with in which
rounds. You will not be paired with the same participant in all the rounds.
You will never know who you are paired with.
In each round one of you will be called Person 1, and the other will be
called Person 2. The computer will decide randomly if you are going to be
Person 1 or 2. You can be Person 1 in some rounds, and Person 2 in other
rounds. The names “Person 1” and “Person 2” are simply labels that allow
us to identify your decision while preserving your anonymity, and allow
you and the other person to know who does what.
Contracts
There are 22 different lists of contracts. Everyone in the room will en-
counter the same 22 lists of contracts, one list in each round, but in a dif-
ferent order.
A contract specifies a certain number of points to Person 1 and to Person 2.
At the end of the experiment, the points that you have earned will be con-
verted into pounds; we explain this below. A contract is shown on your
screen like this:
Person 1: X
Person 2: Y
This means that Person 1 gets X points and Person 2 gets Y points.
Here is an example of a list of three contracts:
Person 1: 50
Person 2: 50
Person 1: 40
Person 2: 40
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Person 1: 60
Person 2: 60
The specific numbers are just for illustration.
Proposing a contract
In each round you and the other person can each propose a contract from
the list. In any round you have two minutes (120 seconds) to make propos-
als.
Messages
You can also send messages to each other during the 120 seconds. How
to do this is explained below.
Agreeing on a contract
If you and the other person propose the same contract, then you have
reached an agreement on that contract.
Your earnings
If there is agreement on a contract, each of you gets the points that the
chosen contract specifies.
If you have not reached an agreement before the two minutes have gone,
neither of you get any points for that round.
THE COMPUTER SCREEN:
We now explain how you make decisions. Here is an example of a round:
On top of the screen you can see which round you are in (in this example,
the 3rd of the 22 rounds) and how much time is left (in this example there
are 85 of the 120 seconds left).
You can also see if you are Person 1 or 2. Recall that your role, 1 or 2,
can change as you encounter different rounds, so please pay attention to
38
this whenever a new round starts. In this example, you are Person 2, so
the other person is Person 1.
The Messages Box
During the 120 seconds you and the other person can write messages to
each other. You write a message by first clicking in the text field (light blue
colour), then you write the text, and hit the “Enter” key to send it. All
messages are shown on your and the other persons screen.
You can write as many or as few messages as you want during the 120
seconds. Please do not send messages that reveal your name, that contain
threats, or that say what might happen outside the lab. If we see that you
send such messages, we reserve the right to exclude you from the rest of
the session, in which case you will not get any money.
The Contracts Box
This box shows the list of contracts. There are three contracts in the exam-
ple. The numbers are just for illustration. Person 1 and Person 2 always
see the contracts arranged in exactly the same way on their screens.
How to propose a contract using the mouse
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You click with your mouse on the contract you want to propose. An arrow
pointing to that contract then appears, and the contract gets a thick border.
Similarly, when the other person proposes a contract an arrow pointing to
the contract appears on the screen, and it gets a thick border. All this is
shown on both your and the other persons screens. In the example above,
Person 1 has proposed the contract that gives 50 points to Person 1 and 50
points to Person 2 (the left arrow), and Person 2 has proposed the contract
that gives 40 points to Person 1 and 40 points to Person 2 (right arrow). If
a person has not made a contract proposal, then there is no arrow for that
person.
You and the other person can make as many or as few proposals as you
want during the 120 seconds. If you want to change your proposal, you
simply click on the contract you now want to propose (the arrow then also
moves). You can also remove a proposal, by clicking on the contract you
have currently proposed (the arrow then disappears). You can decide not
to make any proposals at all.
Reaching an agreement
If Person 1 and Person 2 click on the same contract (so both arrows point to
the same contract), then there is an agreement on that contract. The screen
then “freezes”, and no one can change their proposals. In other words, an
agreement is binding it cannot be undone. Each of you then gets the points
specified by the contract you agreed on.
If you do not both click on the same contract before the 120 seconds have
gone, then there is no agreement, and you each get zero points.
If you and the other person reach an agreement before the 120 seconds
have gone, you are both asked to wait until the 120 seconds have gone.
You then move to the next round. We ask you to remain silent while you
wait.
Note: even if you and the other person have agreed on a contract by ex-
changing messages, you must both still formally record your agreement
by clicking on the agreed contract before the 120 seconds have gone. In
other words, you must make sure that both arrows point to the same con-
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tract before the 120 seconds expire. Otherwise you get no money.
Selecting rounds for payment
When you have made decisions in all 22 rounds, the computer randomly
selects three rounds. These three rounds will be the same for everyone in
the room. At the end of the experiment you will be informed about which
rounds were selected, and then you get the sum of the points you earned
in these three rounds.
When you make decisions in any given round, you should treat that round
in isolation from the other rounds. This is because each of the 22 rounds
can be among the three that are selected for payment, and your earnings
in each of these randomly selected three rounds only depend on what you
do in that round (and not on the 21 other rounds).
Converting points to pounds
Your total earnings in points from the three selected rounds will be con-
verted into pounds using this exchange rate: 20 points = £1.
You will receive your money earnings, and the £4 show-up fee, in cash
at the end of the session.
Are there any questions?
Before we start the first round, there will be some on-screen test questions, and
a practice round.
8.1 Test Questions
Test Questions
Before we start the experiment, we ask you some questions, in order to
make sure that everyone understands what we have just described.
Click with your mouse to answer the questions. The computer will tell
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you if your answer is right or wrong. If the answer is wrong, read the
instructions once more, and try again. If you have any difficulties, raise
your hand and we will help you. When you have answered all questions
correctly, please wait until everyone else has done the same.
Question 1:
Suppose Person 1 and 2 agree on the following contract:
Person 1: 50
Person 2: 120
Which of these statements is correct?
• Person 1 gets 120 and Person 2 gets 50 points.
• Person 1 gets 50 and Person 2 gets 120 points.
• Person 1 and 2 both get zero points.
Question 2:
Which of these statements is correct?
• If I am Person 2 in my first round, then I know that I will also be
Person 2 in all the remaining 21 rounds.
• My role, Person 1 or 2, can change from round to round.
Question 3:
Is this statement correct or incorrect?
In any round, I and the person I am matched with in that round always see the
contracts listed in the same way on our screens.
• Correct.
• Incorrect.
Question 4:
Which of these statements is correct?
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• In order to agree on a contract, we must both click on the same con-
tract before the 120 seconds expire.
• In order to agree on a contract, it is enough that we in our messages
can agree on a contract before the 120 seconds expire.
Question 5:
Is this statement correct or incorrect?
If I and the other participant click on the same contract after for example 48 sec-
onds, then we have an agreement.
• Correct.
• Incorrect.
Question 6:
Indicate whether the following statements are correct or incorrect.
Everyone in the room encounters the 22 lists of contracts in the same order.
• Correct.
• Incorrect.
I will be matched with the same person in all 22 rounds.
• Correct.
• Incorrect.
Question 7:
Is this statement correct or incorrect?
As soon as I and the other person have reached an agreement in a round, we
move on to the next round.
• Correct.
• Incorrect.
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Question 8:
If I and the other person have clicked on the same contract, then that agreement is
binding: I cannot cancel it.
• Correct.
• Incorrect.
Question 9:
Which of these statements is correct?
• I will get the sum of the points I earned in all 22 rounds, and they
will then be converted into pounds.
• I will get the points I earned in three rounds that I do not know in
advance, and they will then be converted into pounds.
Appendix 2: Predictions of the Kalai-Smorodinsky Model
In this appendix we compute the predictions of the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution, as extended to a finite domain by Nagahisa and Tanaka (2002).
Let S be the set of feasible contracts. An element of S is of the form
x = (x1, x2), where xi is the money amount that player i receives in con-
tract x. Since players receive no monetary payoffs in case of disagree-
ment in our games, the disagreement outcome is d = (0, 0). The set
X = S ∪ {d} is the set of feasible monetary outcomes. Given utility func-
tions ui : X → R, define each player’s ideal utility as his or her maximum
achievable utility, denoted by m1 and m2. Formally, for contract set S and
disagreement outcome d, let
m1(S) = max
x∈S,u(x)≥u(d)
u1(x)
and
m2(S) = max
x∈S,u(x)≥u(d)
u2(x).
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Similar expressions hold for contract set T. Next, define the rescaled utility
functions (in what follows we omit the contract set notation; note however
that the normalization below does depend on the contract set)
v1(x) =
u1(x)− u1(0, 0)
m1 − u1(0, 0)
and
v2(x) =
u2(x)− u2(0, 0)
m2 − u2(0, 0) .
These new utility functions represent the same preferences as the original
ones, and they give a measure of how close each player is to their ideal
payoff, relative to the disagreement utility (vi(x) = 1 corresponds to the
case in which player i achieves the maximum possible utility and vi(x) = 0
corresponds to the case in which player i is achieving the disagreement
utility.33)
The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, KS, selects an agreement that brings
all bargainers as close as possible to their ideal point, that is, maximizes the
minimum payoff. Equivalently, KS minimizes the maximum concession.
Formally,
KS = arg maxx∈S,u(x)≥u(d) min{v1(x), v2(x)}.
A geometrical characterization is as follows. In the space of feasible util-
ities (u1, u2), the KS is the set of contracts that maximize a Leontief type
function where all the kinks of its level curves are on the segment that
connects the disagreement point u(d) and the ideal point (m1, m2).
Assuming ui(x) = xi for i = 1, 2, the calculations and predictions are
given in the table, where the rescaled utility functions v have been sub-
scripted with the contract set, S or T, and where m(k) is the ideal point
for contract set k = S, T. Note that we have not included Games 3, 6, 13,
14, 15, 19, 20, 21 and 22. These are games with a strictly dominated de-
coy, and as pointed out in the main text such contracts cannot affect the
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (since the ideal point remains the same).
33One could also say that vi(x) = 1 corresponds to player i making no concessions and
vi(x) = 0 corresponds to player 1 making the maximum possible concession.
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